Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind pronounced the “official doctrine” regarding the nature of the mind and the body as “hailing chiefly from Descartes.” That doctrine, anathematized by Ryle as “the dogma of the ghost in the machine,” is said to hold that every human being is composed of a body and a mind, that the body is physical whereas the mind is not, and that the mind may continue to exist when the body is destroyed. Ryle’s famous attack (...) on the official doctrine has undoubtedly stimulated Cartesian studies, both in those who wish to understand Descartes better in order to make the defense of the doctrine more effective and in those who wish to attack it, sometimes even with arguments which Ryle himself would have rejected. Occasionally, one reads a reference to “Platonic dualism,” not so much as a clearly defined alternative to Cartesian dualism but rather as an inchoate or loose version of Descartes’ doctrine. A recent exception is Richard Rorty who in the first chapter of his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature has insisted on the difference between the Platonic and the Cartesian positions, although it should perhaps be added that his hostility to the former is if anything greater than his hostility to the latter. Without suggesting that there are not obvious similarities in the Platonic and Cartesian versions of dualism, it will perhaps be useful to try to penetrate beneath the slogans in order to get a clearer picture of the arguments which impelled Plato to hold a position the strangeness which was evident even to his contemporaries. (shrink)